This paper analyses the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (AA). It argues that this new legal framework, which has the objective to establish a unique form of political association and economic integration, is characterised by three specific features: comprehensiveness, complexity and conditionality. After a brief background of the EU-Ukraine relations, the following aspects are scrutinised: legal basis and objectives, institutional framework and mechanisms of enhanced conditionality and legislative approximation. In addition, constitutional challenges for the effective implementation of the EU-Ukraine AA are discussed. Based upon a comparison with other EU external agreements, it is demonstrated that the AA is an innovative legal instrument providing for a new type of integration without membership.
Introduction " We are here to sign the Association Agreements between the European Union and each of your countries. These are not just any other agreements -but milestones in the history of our relations and for Europe as a whole. In Kiev and elsewhere, people gave their lives for this closer link to the European Union. We will not forget them". 1 This statement of the President of the European Council was made on 27 June 2014 at the signing ceremony of the bilateral Association Agreements (AAs) between the European Union (EU) and Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. This new generation of AAs will replace the outdated Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) as the basic legal framework for the bilateral relations between the EU and those countries.
According to Herman Van Rompuy, the AA with Ukraine -which served to a large extent as a template for the agreements with Moldova and Georgia 2 -is "the most advanced agreement of its kind ever negotiated by the European Union". 3 A cursory reading of the agreement, counting around 2,140 pages in the Official Journal including 46 annexes, 3 protocols and a joint declaration, already reveals that it is unprecedented both in terms of scope and level of detail. 4 The agreement essentially aims to deepen the political and economic relations between Ukraine and the EU through the establishment of an enhanced institutional framework and innovative provisions on regulatory and legislative approximation. Of particular significance is the ambition to set up a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), leading to "Ukraine's gradual integration in the EU internal market". AAs are tailored to the needs and requirements of the parties involved. Key differences between the EU-Ukraine AA and the Moldova or Georgia AAs are, for example, that Georgia is referred to in the preamble of the Georgia AA as an "Eastern European country" (emphasis added) and that both the Georgia and Moldova AAs do not include a nondiscrimination clause for treatment and mobility of workers, corresponding to Articles 17 and 18 of the EU-Ukraine AA. In the trade part, important differences are, inter alia, that approximation clauses in the area of competition and "internal market treatment" in the area of establishment are not foreseen under the Georgia and Moldova Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs). Also the provisions on trade-related energy and intellectual property rights are less detailed in the Moldova and Georgia DCFTAs. 3 European Council, Press Remarks by H. Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, following the EU-Ukraine Summit, Brussels, 25 February 2013, EUCO 48/13. Available at: <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-13-74_en.htm>, accessed 30.06.2014. 4 Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine of the other part, OJ, 2014, L 161. 5 The explicit reference to "Ukraine's gradual integration in the EU Internal Market" as one of the AA's objectives (Art. 1 (d)) is quite remarkable. In comparison, the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAAs) and pre-accession instruments such as the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs) with the Western Balkan countries do not include such a reference in their corresponding articles. For example, the objectives of the SAAs only aim "to promote harmonious economic relations and develop gradually a free trade area" (Art. 1(1)(f) EU-Serbia SAA, OJ, 2010, L 28/2). Accordingly, the AA belongs to the selected group of "integration-oriented agreements", i.e. agreements including principles, concepts and provisions of EU law which are to be interpreted and applied as if the third State is part of the EU. 6 Such agreements are an exceptional phenomenon in the practice of the EU's external action. Apart from the well-known multilateral examples of the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement, the Energy Community Treaty (EnC Treaty) and the European Common Aviation Area Agreement (ECAA), 7 a limited number of specific bilateral agreements also deserve this qualification. 8 It will be argued that the EU-Ukraine AA is unique in many respects and, therefore, provides a new type of integration without membership. 9 The agreement can be characterised by three specific features: comprehensiveness, complexity and conditionality.
First, the AA is a comprehensive framework agreement covering the entire spectrum of EU-Ukraine relations. Hence, it includes provisions dealing with the whole array of EU activities, including cooperation and convergence in the field of common foreign and security policy (CFSP) as well as cooperation in the area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ). 10 Moreover, due to the inclusion of provisions on nuclear energy and areas falling within Member State competences, the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and all EU Member States are also contracting parties to the agreement. Whereas the Treaty of Lisbon significantly facilitates the conclusion of what used to be called 'cross-pillar agreements', the comprehensive scope of the agreement necessarily generates a certain complexity. For instance, the AA provisions dealing with the AFSJ do not bind the United Kingdom and Ireland as EU Member States as a result of the 'opt-out' granted under Protocol 21 to the EU Treaties. Yet, those countries are bound as separate contracting parties due to the mixed nature of the agreement and can decide to 'opt in' as part of the EU after notifying Ukraine. A specific regime also applies to Denmark, in accordance with Protocol 22 to the EU Treaties. The comprehensive scope of the AA also implies that in certain areas of cooperation there is an overlap with existing agreements and obligations. Pursuant to Article 479 of the EU-Ukraine AA, such (existing) agreements "shall be considered part of the overall bilateral relations as governed by this Agreement and as forming part of a common institutional framework." As a result, the AA includes various provisions clarifying the relationship with other bilateral and multilateral agreements aiming to ensure a coherent legal framework for EU-Ukraine relations. 11 This again contributes to the complexity of the agreement, for instance as far as dispute settlement mechanisms are concerned (cf. infra).
Second, the complexity of the AA is not only related to its comprehensive scope but also to its level of ambition, in particular the aim to achieve Ukraine's economic integration in the EU internal market through the establishment of a DCFTA. The objective of 'deep' integration requires extensive (Contd.) The EMAAs aim to "establish the conditions for the gradual liberalisation of trade in goods, services and capital" (Art. 1(2) EU-Morocco EMAA, OJ, 2000, L 70/2). 6 The expression "integration-oriented agreements" is borrowed from M. legislative and regulatory approximation including sophisticated mechanisms to secure the uniform interpretation and effective implementation of relevant EU legislation.
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Last but not least, the EU-Ukraine AA is based on a strict conditionality approach. The preamble to the agreement explicitly states that "political association and economic integration of Ukraine within the European Union will depend on progress in the implementation of the current agreement as well as Ukraine's track record in ensuring respect for common values, and progress in achieving convergence with the EU in political, economic and legal areas."
13 This link between the third country's performance and the deepening of the EU's engagement is a key characteristic of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP). Whereas this principle has so-far been applied on the basis of soft-law instruments such as Action Plans and the Association Agenda, it is now encapsulated in a legally binding bilateral agreement.
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In what follows the specific features of the EU-Ukraine AA are analysed in more detail in order to illustrate that the agreement opens a new chapter in the EU's relations with its neighbouring countries and, more generally, in its external relations practice. After a brief introduction to the background of the new AA, its legal basis and objectives are discussed. Subsequently, specific attention is devoted to the institutional framework, mechanisms of conditionality and the procedures for legislative approximation and dispute settlement. A final section deals with the constitutional challenges for the effective implementation of the EU-Ukraine AA.
Background of EU-Ukraine relations: From Partnership and Cooperation to Association
The AA will replace the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) as the basic legal framework of EU-Ukraine relations. 15 The PCA, which was signed in 1994, entered into force in March 1998 for an initial period of ten years. 16 Pursuant to Article 101, the agreement is automatically extended each year unless either side informs the other party of its denunciation at least six months before the expiry date. Whereas, from a legal point of view, the PCA could therefore continue to apply without formal problems, a revision of the legal framework was urgently needed. 17 Due to internal developments in both the EU and Ukraine, several provisions of the PCA are out of date and no longer reflect the current ambition of the bilateral relationship. The preamble and Article 1, for instance, refer to Ukraine as "a country with an economy in transition", which is no longer appropriate after the country's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2008.
Moreover, the agreement includes general and broadly defined provisions on economic co-operation 18 but stops short of any regional trade integration. Article 4 PCA only provides that the parties consider 12 A. Lazowski, op. cit. supra note 9, 1433. 13 Emphasis added.
14 See e.g. the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda (EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council, 'Recommendation on the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda to prepare and facilitate the implementation of the Association Agreement', UE-UA 1057/0923, 23 November 2009, updated in 2011). 15 Art. 479 EU-Ukraine AA.
"whether circumstances allow the beginning of negotiations on the establishment of a free trade area". 19 Like many other provisions of the agreement, this so-called 'evolutionary clause' is essentially a declaration of intent without any direct legal consequences.
The minimalistic approach of the PCA is particularly well-illustrated as regards the objective of approximating Ukraine's existing and future legislation to that of the EU. While recognizing that this process of legislative approximation is an important condition for strengthening the economic links between the parties, Article 51 PCA proclaims that Ukraine "shall endeavour to ensure that its legislation be gradually made compatible with that of the Community [now Union]". 20 This can hardly be regarded as a formal legal commitment.
Its vague and open-ended formulation gave the Ukrainian authorities a large freedom to define the time-schedule and methods of implementation. There is only an obligation to act but without a requirement to achieve particular results or a sanction in case the approximation of laws obligation is not fulfilled. Moreover, the approximation clause includes a long list of "priority areas" for legislative action 21 but fails to provide clear guidelines on the scope and content of the EU laws to be taken as the basis for approximation nor does it include a link with the objective to establish a Free Trade Area (FTA) in the future.
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The launch of the ENP in the wake of the EU's eastward enlargement provided new impetus to EUUkraine relations. In this context, the European Commission proposed to move beyond mere cooperation to a significant degree of economic integration in return for concrete progress in terms of legal approximation. 23 In the short term, an ENP Action Plan -adopted with Ukraine in 2005 for a period of three years -laid down political and economic priorities for reform whereas the negotiation of a new bilateral framework agreement to replace the PCA was considered to be a long term objective.
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Regarding the objective of trade liberalisation and economic integration, the first Commission Communications were ambitious but vague, stating that the ENP Partners should be offered "a prospect of a stake in the EU's Internal Market". 25 These ambitions were further developed in the context of the EU's 2006 "Global Europe Strategy", the new trade policy agenda set out by the European Commission. 26 According to this new approach, the EU would seek to go beyond WTO commitments in promoting trade liberalisation and integration, by tackling issues which are not ready for multilateral discussion. 27 This implies the ambition to conclude a new generation of comprehensive and ambitious free-trade agreements, including far-reaching liberalization of services and investment and the abolition of non-tariff barriers through regulatory convergence with regard to issues such as (Contd.) energy, environment, cooperation in science and technology, tourism, monetary policy, social cooperation, money laundering, regional development, information and communication, statistical cooperation, etc. 19 Art. 4 EU-Ukraine PCA.
the protection of intellectual property rights, competition law, rules of origin, labour standards and environmental protection. At the end of 2006, the Commission announced its intention to negotiate "deep and comprehensive free trade agreements" (DCFTAs) with the EU's neighbours including "substantially all trade in goods and services" and "strong legally-binding provisions on trade and economic regulatory issues".
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Against the political background of the Orange Revolution, Ukraine was the first ENP country to start negotiations on a new Association Agreement in March 2007 as part of a general revision of the bilateral legal framework. Negotiations on the DCFTA were only launched in February 2008 after Ukraine's accession to the WTO. A political agreement was reached in December 2011 and the AA was initialled in March 2012. 29 On 15 May 2013, the Commission adopted the proposals for a Council Decision on the signing and conclusion of the EU-Ukraine AA. 30 Nevertheless, this agreement was not immediately signed due to demands on behalf of the EU to abandon the practice of selective justice and to align the Ukrainian judiciary and law enforcement systems with European standards. 31 Eventually, on the eve of the EaP Summit in Vilnius, the Ukrainian Government decided to suspend the process of preparation for signature of the AA in order "to ensure the national security of Ukraine and to recover trade and economic relations with the Russian Federation". 32 Following this news, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians went to the streets. The ensuing Maidan revolution led to the dismissal of President Victor Yanukovych on 22 February 2014 and the establishment of an InterimGovernment under the leadership of Arseniy Yatsenyuk. Proceeding with the signature of the EUUkraine AA was a clear short-term objective for the new authorities in Kiev.
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Despite the political pressure to act quickly, this was not an evident option. Under the Ukrainian Constitution, the President is responsible for the signature of international agreements. 34 After the escape of Victor Yanukovych, Ukraine only had an acting President (Olexander Turchynov) who was appointed by the Parliament without elections. Taking into account the legal and political significance of the AA, including long-term and far-reaching commitments of legislative approximation with the EU, this clearly raised some questions of legitimacy. At the same time, there was also a growing understanding that a clear message of solidarity to the Ukrainian people was needed in light of the mounting Russian pressure on Crimea and the Eastern part of Ukraine. In this context, the EU Heads of State or Government announced on 6 March 2014 that "as a matter of priority" all the political chapters of the AA would be signed first. In addition, the adoption of autonomous trade measures "would allow Ukraine to benefit substantially from the advantages offered in the Deep 36 and on 14 April 2014, after a 'fast track' approval process, the European Parliament and the Council adopted a Regulation "on the reduction or elimination of customs duties on goods originating in Ukraine." 37 Accordingly, Ukraine can benefit from the EU's unilateral trade preferences in accordance with the schedule of concessions set in out in annex I-A of the AA in anticipation of the (provisional) application of the entire agreement. 38 It is noteworthy that the political and economic parts of the EU-Ukraine AA remain part of a single legal instrument. 39 In other words, the partial signature of the agreement on 21 March 2014 may essentially be regarded as a political gesture underlining the parties' commitment to shared values and the objectives of the envisaged association. The direct legal implications are fairly limited because the political provisions are rather general in nature. In addition to a list of general principles underlying the bilateral relationship, they include the establishment of a multi-level political dialogue and convergence in the field of CFSP. Moreover, this partial signature did not result in the entry into force of these 'political' chapters, neither to their provisional application. It was only after the final signature of the entire agreement on 27 June 2014 by the newly elected President Petro Poroshenko that the ratification procedure for the entire agreement could be initiated. Because the EU-Ukraine AA is a mixed agreement, which needs to be ratified by all 28 EU Member States, this procedure can take several years. In order to circumvent this long ratification procedure, Article 486 of the EU-Ukraine AA provides for the possibility of the provisional application of the agreement. 40 Given the political significance of the EU-Ukraine AA, the Council agreed on an exceptional wide scope for provisional application, including, inter alia, the entire title on General Principles (Title I) and Financial Cooperation (Title VI), almost the entire DCFTA (Title IV), Institutional, General and Final Provisions (Title VII) and several provisions regarding political dialogue (Arts. 4-6), Justice, Freedom and Security (Arts. 14 and 19) and economic and sectoral cooperation. 41 This broad scope could raise 36 The 'political provisions' of the agreement which were signed on 21 questions on the provisional application of 'mixed' elements of the AA. In this view, it is stated in the Council Decisions on the signing of the AA that these listed provisions shall be applied on a provisional basis "only to the extent that they cover matters falling within the Union's competence, including matters falling within the Union's competence to define and implement a common foreign and security policy". 42 In addition, the Council, Commission and High Representative adopted a Joint Statement providing that the provisional application of the General Principles set down in Article 2 "is without prejudice to the division of competences between the Union and the Member States on the matters referred to therein".
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Legal Basis and Objectives
The comprehensive and complex nature of the AA is reflected in the choice of legal basis. The Council Decision on the signing and provisional application of the political provisions, adopted on 17 March 2014, combines the legal basis for EU action in the area of CFSP (Arts. 31(1) and 37 Treaty on the EU (TEU)) with the traditional provision on association (Art. 217 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU)). 44 From a procedural point of view, the presence of a CFSP legal basis does not make a major difference because association agreements already require unanimity in the Council. 45 Moreover, the CFSP dimension of the AA is too limited to overrule Art. 218(6)a(i) TFEU which requires the consent of the European Parliament for the conclusion of association agreements. 46 Nevertheless, the combination of CFSP/TFEU legal bases may be regarded as a logical consequence of the continuing bipolarity of the EU's external action as reflected in Article 40 TEU. 47 The EUUkraine AA is one of the first examples of this new practice, which stems from the Lisbon Treaty 46 According to Art. 218(6) TFEU an association agreement can only be concluded without the consent of the European Parliament if it relates "exclusively" to CFSP. In recent Case C-658/11, Commission v. Council, the Court of Justice clarified that the substantive legal basis of a Council decision adopted for the conclusion of an international agreement determines the procedures to followed. Hence, only when the substantive legal basis exclusively relates to the area of CFSP, the European Parliament does not play a role in this process. 47 See, on this new form of mixity: A. Dashwood, "The continuing bipolarity of EU external action", in: I. Govaere, E. amendments to the procedural code for negotiating and concluding international agreements on behalf of the EU.
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A more controversial question concerned the adoption of two separate Council Decisions for the signature and provisional application of the remaining titles of the EU-Ukraine AA on 27 June 2014. 49 Despite the Commission proposal for a single decision on the basis of Article 217 TFEU, the Council opted to 'split off' the provisions relating to the treatment of third-country nationals legally employed as workers in the territory of the parties (Art. 17 EU-Ukraine AA). The latter formed the subject of a separate Council Decision adopted on the basis of Article 79(2)(b) TFEU. 50 The main reason for this complexity is the specific status of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the EU competences in the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ). Pursuant to Protocol 21 to the Treaty of Lisbon, both countries have the discretionary power to decide whether or not they want to take part in the adoption of legislative acts under this title. 51 Taking into account that Article 17 of the EU-Ukraine AA falls within the scope of the AFSJ, in particular Article 79(2)(b) TFEU on the rights of thirdcountry nationals residing legally in the EU Member States, a separate Council Decision was deemend necessary. Nevertheless, this option is not undisputable. Article 17 AA is an integral part of the estabished association and it seems far-fetched to argue that the aim and content of this provision is distinct from and independent of the aim and content of the other provisions of the AA. Moreover, in its recent judgment Commission v Council (Case C-377/12), the Court of Justice of the EU (Court of Justice) considered the addition of specific legal bases relating to readmission of third-country nationals (Art. 79(3) TFEU, transport (Arts 91 and 100 TFEU) and environment (Art. 191(4) TFEU) unnecessary and unlawful for the signature of a Framework Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between the EU and the Republic of the Philipiness. 52 In the Court's view, the broad scope of Articles 207 and 209 TFEU dealing, respectively, with common commercial policy and development cooperation was sufficient to cover the entire agreement. Of course, the context and the objectives of the EU-Ukraine AA are entirely different. Nevertheless, the argument may be made that Article 217 TFEU on association is a 'catch-all' provision, which does not require the adoption of a separate Council decision related to one specific provision of the agreement. This interpretation was not only strongly supported by the European Commission 53 but also by several Member States.
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Taking into account the political importance of the EU-Ukraine AA, it seems unlikely that the final decision to use a 'split' legal basis will be challenged before the Court of Justice.
Remarkably, the Council Decisions on the signature of the provisional application of the AA remain silent on Article 8 TEU. 55 The latter provision, entitled 'The Union and its neighbours', was 48 The unified procedure for the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements on behalf of the EU is laid down in introduced with the Treaty of Lisbon and endows the Union with an explicit competence to conclude specific agreements with neighbouring countries. 56 Article 8 TEU envisages a duty of the EU to "develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on co-operation". Both procedural and political arguments may help to explain the absence of Article 8 TEU as a legal basis for the new AA with Ukraine.
First, the procedure for concluding association agreements under Article 217 TFEU is well-defined whereas the EU Treaties do not include any procedural guidelines for agreements to be concluded under Article 8 TEU. Taking into account also its unusual location under Title I 'Common Provisions' of the TEU, it is even questionable whether Article 8 TEU can be used as an autonomous substantive legal basis. Rather, it may be regarded as a mainly political instrument alongside the substantive legal provisions on EU external action in the TFEU. In any event, from a legal point of view, a reference to Article 8 TEU is not required for the conclusion of an association agreement, even when the partner is a neighbouring country of the Union.
Second, anything less than formal association based on Article 217 TFEU would not be perceived by the Eastern neighbours as an enhancement of their existing contractual relations. 57 In contrast to Article 217 TFEU, Article 8 TEU has a clear finalité, i.e. "to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation". This focus on 'good neighbourliness' sits uncomfortably with the European aspirations of certain Eastern partners, in particular Ukraine. In this context, it is noteworthy that from the very start of the negotiations, the Ukrainian authorities opposed against the use of the 'neighbourhood' label for the new agreement arguing that Ukraine is a part of Europe and not of the European neighbourhood. 58 Only after a period of uncertainty about the legal status of what was diplomatically called an 'enhanced agreement', a Joint Declaration adopted on the occasion of the September 2008 EU-Ukraine Summit made an end to all speculations as it unequivocally provided that "the new agreement between the European Union and Ukraine will be an association agreement". 59 This offer was later extended to all Eastern Partnership countries. 60 Arguably, this evolution of the ENP has implications for the potential use of Article 8 TEU. Whereas this article was introduced as a basis for the conclusion of special 'neighbourhood agreements', the explicit offer to negotiate and conclude formal association agreements makes it difficult if not impossible to avoid the traditional provision of Article 217 TFEU. The conclusion of association agreements with European countries is often perceived as a steppingstone towards EU membership. 62 For example, after the signing ceremony on 27 June 2014, the heads of State or Government of the three associated countries linked the conclusion of the AAs with their (long-term) EU membership aspirations. 63 However, there is no automatic link between association and accession prospects. The AA with Ukraine carefully avoids any direct reference to future membership perspectives for Ukraine but somewhat diplomatically observes that "the European Union acknowledges the European aspirations of Ukraine and welcomes its European choice". This formulation is somewhat reminiscent of the formula used in the old Europe Agreements with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 64 It does not entail any legal or political commitment towards further enlargement on behalf of the Union. The AA is thus not a pre-accession agreement such as the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs) with the Western Balkan countries, 65 however, it neither excludes a membership perspective. In this view, the preamble states that "this Agreement shall not prejudice and leaves open future developments in EU-Ukraine relations." 66 In addition, the parties explicitly recognize that "Ukraine as a European country shares a common history and common values with the Member States of the EU and is committed to promoting those values." The parallels with the first sentence of Article 49 TEU are obvious. Moreover, it is noteworthy that several provisions reflect the formulation of the Copenhagen pre-accession criteria. Political criteria such as stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms are not only defined as 'essential elements' of the AA, 67 they are also an integral part of the established political dialogue 68 and cooperation in the area of freedom, security and justice. 69 At the economic level, the establishment of a DCFTA is regarded as an instrument "to complete [Ukraine's] transition into a functioning market economy". 70 Last but not least, the entire agreement is based on Ukraine's commitment to achieve "convergence with the EU in political, economic and legal areas". Nevertheless, the AA does not aim at the preparation of Ukraine's accession to the EU but at the establishment of "close and privileged links". 71 In other words, the key objective of the AA is to ensure Ukraine's partial integration in the EU without offering any concrete membership perspective. It is well known that such a process raises significant challenges in terms of the EU acquis export and, in particular, for the uniform interpretation and application of the shared legal framework within legal 62 D. Phinnemore, Association: Stepping-Stone or Alternative to EU Membership? (Sheffield Academic Press, 1999). 63 A. Rettman, 'Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine cement EU ties', EUobserver, 27 June 2014, available at <http://euobserver.com/foreign/124792> accessed 30.06.2014. 64 For instance, in the preamble to the EA with Poland the parties recognized "the fact that the final objective of Poland is to become a member of the Community and that this association […] will help to achieve this objective". In other words, accession was regarded as a clear ambition of the associated states but not as a mutual objective. See: B. Lippert, 'Shaping and Evaluating the Europe Agreements -The Community Side', in B. Lippert, H. Schneider (Eds.), Monitoring Association and Beyond: The European Union and the Visegrad States (Europa Union Verlag, 1995), 227-229. 65 The SAAs explicitly refer to the Western Balkan countries' status as "a potential candidate for EU membership". Also the Association Agreement with Turkey is conceived to "facilitate the accession of Turkey to the [Union] at a later date". 66 As a reaction to the turbulent 'Maidan protests' and the following events, the Council emphasised on several occasions that "the Association Agreement does not constitute the final goal in EU-Ukraine cooperation" (e.g. Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, 'Conclusions on Ukraine', 10 February 2014). Also at the signing ceremony on 27 June 2014, H. Van Rompuy stated that "these agreements are not the final stage of our cooperation" (op. cit. supra footnote 1). These statements can be considered as a careful attempt by the (European) Council to support the pro-EU forces in Ukraine with an EU-perspective while avoiding explicit references to EU accession. A stronger EU membership perspective was contested by several Member States such as France and the Netherlands, available at <http://euobserver.com/foreign/123078>, accessed 30.06.2014. 67 Preamble EU-Ukraine AA. 68 Art. 6 EU-Ukraine AA. 69 Art. 14 EU-Ukraine AA. systems of third countries. 72 For this purpose, the AA with Ukraine introduces a reinforced institutional framework, enhanced forms of conditionality and sophisticated mechanisms for legal approximation and dispute settlement which are distinct from other existing models of integration without membership.
A Reinforced Institutional Framework
The EU-Ukraine AA establishes a multi-level institutional framework that is based on practices of other EU association agreements but bears some considerable novelties. Summit meetings at the highest political level shall take place on an annual basis providing overall guidance for the implementation of the agreement and an opportunity to discuss issues of mutual interest.
73 This is a confirmation of an already existing practice even though the EU-Ukraine PCA did not include such an explicit provision. A more significant development for the EU-Ukraine relations is the creation of an Association Council, meeting at Ministerial level, with decision-making capacities. 74 The Association Council plays a crucial role in the process of legislative approximation. It operates as a forum for exchange of information on EU and Ukrainian legislative acts and is competent to update or amend the agreement's annexes to keep pace with evolutions in EU law. 75 An Association Committee with representatives at senior civil servant level assists the Association Council in the performance of its duties. 76 Moreover, specific sub-committees can be established. 77 With regard to the DCFTA, a specific role is played by the Trade Committee and specialised sub-committees dealing with issues such as sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), geographical indications or trade and sustainable development (see infra). Continuing the existing practice under the EU-Ukraine PCA, a Parliamentary Association Committee exchanges views and can make recommendations to the Association Council.
78 A complete novelty in the EU's association practice is the introduction of a bilateral Civil Society Platform consisting of members of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), on the one hand, and representatives of civil society on the side of Ukraine, on the other. 79 Civil society cooperation forms a specific chapter of the AA and aims, amongst others, to ensure a better mutual knowledge and understanding between the parties. 80 
Enhanced Conditionality in the EU-Ukraine AA
Conditionality is one of the key strategic tools of the ENP and it is, therefore, no surprise that this instrument also occupies a prominent place in the EU-Ukraine AA. Two different forms of conditionality can be distinguished. On the one hand, the AA includes several provisions related to Ukraine's commitment to the common European values of democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms ('common values' conditionality). On the other hand, the part on the DCFTA is based on an explicit 'market access' conditionality implying that Ukraine will only be granted additional access to a section of the EU Internal Market if the EU decides, after a strict monitoring procedure, that Ukraine successfully implemented its legislative approximation commitments. Both forms of conditionality bear some revolutionary features in comparison to other external agreements concluded between the EU and third countries.
Common values conditionality
International agreements concluded on behalf of the EU include standard conditionality clauses. In general, an 'essential element clause' defining the core common values of the relationship is combined with a 'suspension' clause including a procedure to suspend the agreement in case of violation of those essential elements.
84 Such a mechanism is also included in the EU-Ukraine AA. 85 Yet, the common values conditionality in the EU-Ukraine AA differs from similar provisions included in, for instance, the SAAs with the Western Balkans. First, in addition to the standard reference to democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms as defined by international legal instruments (Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms), 86 a specific reference to human rights and fundamental freedoms is included in Article 6 AA on "dialogue and cooperation on domestic reform" 87 and in Article 14 AA dealing with EU-Ukraine cooperation on justice, freedom and security. 88 Second, the essential elements of the EU-Ukraine AA contain common values that go beyond classical human rights and also include very strong security elements such as the "promotion of respect for the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, inviolability of borders and independence, as well as countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, related materials and their means of delivery". 89 Third, "the principles of free market economy" as well as a list of other issues such as "rule of law, the fight against corruption, the fight against the different forms of trans-national organised crime and terrorism, the promotion of sustainable 84 87 This dialogue foresees that the parties "shall cooperate in order to ensure that their internal policies are based on principles common to the parties in particular stability and effectiveness of democratic institutions and the rule of law and on respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms". 88 Remarkably, Art. 80 of the SAA with Serbia only refers to "reinforcement of institutions and the rule of law" in relation to cooperation in the field of justice, freedom and security whereas the largely Art. 14 of the EU-Ukraine AA is entitled "rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms" [emphasis added]. It also explicitly provides that "respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms will guide all cooperation on justice, freedom and security." Such a sentence is absent in Art. 80 of the SAA with Serbia and comparable provisions in other SAAs. 89 Art. 2 EU-Ukraine AA. In comparison, Arts. 2 and 3 of the SAA with Serbia only include full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as essential elements of the agreement. On the other hand, Art. 2 of the SAA includes a general reference to "respect for principles of international law", which is not in Art. 2 of the EU-Ukraine AA. development and effective multilateralism" are not included in the definition of essential elements. 90 Rather, they are considered to "underpin" the relationship between the parties and are "central to enhancing" this relationship. 91 In other words, a distinction is made between hard core common values related to fundamental rights and security and a range of other general principles that are deemed crucial for developing closer relations but which cannot trigger the suspension of the entire agreement.
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Market access conditionality
Apart from the more general 'common values' conditionality, the EU-Ukraine AA entails a specific form of 'market access' conditionality, which is explicitly linked to the process of legislative approximation. Hence, it is one of the specific mechanisms introduced to tackle the challenges of integration without membership. Of particular significance is a far-reaching monitoring of Ukraine's efforts to approximate national legislation to EU law, including aspects of implementation and enforcement. 93 To facilitate the assessment process, the Ukrainian government is obliged to provide reports to the EU in line with approximation deadlines specified in the Agreement. 94 In addition to the drafting of progress reports, which is a common practice within the EU's pre-accession strategy and the ENP, the monitoring procedure may include "on-the-spot missions, with the participation of EU institutions, bodies and agencies, non-governmental bodies, supervisory authorities, independent experts and others as needed."
95 Arguably, the latter option is a new and far-reaching instrument introduced precisely to guarantee that legislative approximation goes beyond a formal adaptation of national legislation.
The results of the monitoring activities are to be discussed within the joint bodies established under the AA (cf. supra). Such bodies may adopt recommendations on the basis of unanimity but it is only the Association Council (or the Trade Committee) which shall decide on further market opening if the parties agree that the necessary measures covered within the DCFTA part of the agreement have been implemented and are being enforced. 96 Significantly, recommendations or decisions of the joint institutional bodies as well as a failure to reach such recommendations or decisions cannot be challenged under the specific DCFTA dispute settlement procedure. 97 In other words, the 'market opening' conditionality is very strict. From a legal point of view, it requires the agreement of both parties to proceed. Of course, in practice, Ukraine will be the requesting party which places the EU in a powerful position to decide on the pace and scope of market opening.
Because market access conditionality is so closely intertwined with legislative approximation, its key mechanisms will be further illustrated in the next chapter on legislative approximation and dispute settlement. 96 Art. 475 (5) EU-Ukraine AA Sometimes, the decision about market accession is specifically endowed to the Trade Committee. This is, for instance, the case with regard to services and establishment (Art. 4 Annex XVII) and public procurement (Art. 154). 97 Art. 475(6) EU-Ukraine AA.
Mechanisms of Legislative Approximation and Dispute Settlement
In contrast to the PCA, which only includes a very general 'best endeavour clause' (cf. supra), 98 the new AA contains multiple specific provisions on legislative and regulatory approximation including detailed annexes specifying the procedure and pace of the approximation process for different policy areas. 99 The various approximation clauses differ in the sense that for some areas the annexes contain detailed lists of relevant EU legislation whereas others are more general in nature or even lack a clear legal obligation to approximate. To a certain extent, the variation between these approximation provisions is the result of the different objectives of each chapter.
Not surprisingly, the most advanced mechanisms of legislative approximation are to be found in chapters related to the establishment of the DCFTA. The AA also includes several mechanisms to deal with the dynamic evolution of the incorporated EU acquis as well as sophisticated forms of dispute settlement.
A patchwork of legislative approximation clauses
Article 474 of the EU-Ukraine AA provides that "Ukraine will carry out gradual approximation of its legislation to EU law" as referred to in no less than 44 annexes to the agreement and based on specific commitments and mechanisms identified in both the annexes and specific titles to the agreement. Separate approximation clauses can be found in Title IV on the DCFTA, Title V on Economic and Sector Cooperation and Title VI on Financial Cooperation. Other EU-Ukraine AA Titles contain rather general provisions referring to international conventions or "European and international standards" 100 and cannot be considered as approximation clauses sensu stricto because there is no clear obligation to incorporate EU legislation.
In the Title on Economic and Sector Cooperation, most chapters share a similar 'standard approximation clause' providing that Ukraine shall gradually approximate its legislation to the EU acquis as set out in the annex to the chapter concerned. 101 Each of these annexes provides a list of specific EU legislation and a timetable for approximation. 102 Even though the annexes state that Ukraine only "undertakes" to gradually approximate to the selected EU legislation, they provide a strict deadline against when the selection of EU acquis "shall be implemented". 103 Other 98 Largely comparable 'best endeavour' clauses are also included in the SAAs and in the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAAs). Of course, the pre-accession process develops the voluntary nature of the SAA approximation clauses into a firm obligation considering Article 49 TEU and the Copenhagen criteria. Regarding the EMAAs, it is noteworthy that the nature of the obligation is even softer than under the PCAs as they only prescribe that "cooperation" 99 Art. 474 of the EU-Ukraine AA, however, recapitulates the entire scope of Ukraine's legislative approximation commitments "as referred to in Annexes I to XLIV to this Agreement, based on the commitments identified in Titles IV, V and VI of this Agreement, and according to the provisions of those Annexes". 100 Art. 15 EU-Ukraine AA. 101 Also Title VI on Financial cooperation contains such a standard approximation clause (Art. 459 EU-Ukraine AA). approximation clauses in this title are less ambitious as they do not list a selection of EU acquis in an annex 104 or because they lack a firm binding obligation to approximate.
105
The most elaborate approximation clauses can be found in Title IV on the establishment of the DCFTA. In several DCFTA Chapters, the process of legislative approximation is clearly linked to additional access to the EU Internal Market. For example, in the area of technical barriers to trade,
106
Ukraine must "incorporate the relevant EU acquis" in line with the timetable set out in Annex III. It is only when the "EU Party" has determined that Ukraine has fully approximated its legislation to the listed EU acquis that additional access to its Internal Market will be offered in the form of the conclusion of an Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAA). 107 Remarkably, Annex III does not contain a clear selection of EU acquis such as in the standard approximation clauses but refers to "sectors" of horizontal (framework) and vertical (sectoral) legislation. The absence of a precise selection of EU legislation in this Annex can be explained by the fact that contracting Parties to an ACAA are still free, to a certain extent, to establish and maintain own regulations and standards. 108 Similarly, in the area of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), Ukraine "shall" approximate its sanitary, phytosanitary and animal welfare legislation to that of the EU as set out in Annex V. 109 In this case, the conditional market access offered to Ukraine takes the form of the "determination of equivalence", which means that the EU shall accept, under conditions, Ukraine's SPS measures as equivalent, even if these measures differ from the Union's standards, and vice versa. 110 Again, this determination of equivalence will only be initiated once the EU-Ukraine SPS Sub-Committee decides, after regular monitoring, that Ukraine's approximation process, as set out in Annex V, is achieved.
111
Initially, Annex V does not provide a clear list of EU legislation. However, three months after the entry into force of the AA, Ukraine must submit a "Comprehensive Strategy" to the SPS SubCommittee. This document will be incorporated in Annex V of the EU-Ukraine AA and serve as a reference document for the implementation of this Agreement into the legal system of Ukraine.
112
The most detailed provisions on legislative approximation are included in DCFTA Chapter 6 on Services, Establishment and Electronic Commerce, more specific in its sub-sections on Postal and Courier Services, Electronic Communications, Financial Services and International Maritime Transport Services.
113 They all contain the same approximation clause according to which "Ukraine shall ensure that its existing laws and future legislation will be gradually made compatible with the EU 112 Combined reading of Art. 64(4) and Annex V EU-Ukraine AA. This document must be divided into three priority areas as foreseen in Annex IV. 113 These Sub-Sections, respectively Sub-section 4-7, are part of Section 5 "Regulatory Framework".
acquis".
114 These are the only provisions in the AA explicitly obliging Ukraine also to approximate its "future" legislation to the EU acquis. Moreover, these provisions are further fleshed out in Annex XVII which defines specific horizontal rules and principles on legislative approximation and a clear selection of EU legislation. This annex refers to over more than 80 specific EU Directives and Regulations and a strict timetable against when (parts of) these EU acts must be implemented. 115 The annex also contains "General principles and obligations" on legislative approximation which determines how the listed EU legislation will be made binding upon the Parties and "made part of Ukraine's internal legal order". 116 Reflecting but not copying Article 288 TFEU, Article 2 of this Annex specifies that an act in this Annex corresponding to an EU Regulation or Decision "shall as such be made part of the internal legal order of Ukraine" whereas an act corresponding to an EU Directive "shall leave to the authorities of Ukraine the choice of form and method of implementation". 117 This provision only appears in a limited number of integration agreements and was first used in the EEA Agreement. 118 The difference, of course, is that in the case of the EUUkraine AA, this provision only applies to a limited part of the annexed EU acquis (i.e. Annex XVII). Also similar to the EEA Agreement are the "Horizontal Adaptations and Procedural Rules", 119 which stipulate which adaptations must be made to the EU acts listed in this Annex in order to be implemented in Ukraine's legal system.
120
The reason for this far-reaching parallelism with the EEA Agreement is that legal approximation in this particular field will lead to the granting of "internal market treatment". This unprecedented access to the EU Internal Market means that juridical persons of Ukraine will have the same freedom of establishment and will be able to provide services in the EU as juridical persons of EU Member States.
121 Again, this internal market treatment goes hand in hand with strict market access conditionality: it will only be granted to the services concerned if the Trade Committee decides, after a strict monitoring procedure, that Ukraine has achieved its legislative approximation commitments.
122
The monitoring procedure, clearly inspired by the Union's pre-accession policy, requires that Ukraine submits for each sector roadmaps, progress reports and "transposition tables" to the Commission to prove the correct application of its approximation obligations.
123
The last DCFTA Chapter that contains a clear legislative approximation obligation linked to additional market access is public procurement. Ukraine is obliged to make its public procurement legislation "compatible" with the EU public procurement acquis". 124 In return, after a positive evaluation of the Trade Committee, Ukraine and the EU will grant access to contract award procedures to companies of the other Party pursuant to their procurement rules under treatment no less favourable than that 114 Respectively Arts. 114, 124, 133 and 138 EU-Ukraine AA. The latter has however a slightly more nuanced formulation. 115 Appendix XVII-2 to XVII-5 EU-Ukraine AA. 116 Art. 2 Annex XVII EU-Ukraine AA. 117 In the EU, a Regulation is "directly applicable" in all the Member States whereas acts listed in the Annex corresponding to an EU Regulations (or Decision) "must be made part" of Ukraine's legal order, which means that the act still has to be transposed into Ukraine's legal system. 118 Art. 7 EEA. See also Art. 3 ECAA. 119 Appendix XVII-1 EU-Ukraine AA contains horizontal adaptations regarding, inter alia, specific terminology of EU acts, references to Member States, territories and institutions and the entry into force of the relevant acts. 120 In the EEA Agreement, the "Horizontal Adaptations" are added to the Agreement in Protocol 1. Also the ECAA contains such "Horizontal adaptations and certain Procedural Rules" (Annex II ECAA). 121 Art. 4(3) Annex XVII EU-Ukraine AA.
accorded to its own companies. 125 Again, this constitutes "an unprecedented example in allowing possible access of Ukraine, as a non EEA Member to EU Public Procurement Market". 126 The scope of EU public procurement legislation to which Ukraine must approximate is listed in Annex XXI and focuses on Public Procurement Directives 2004/18/EC and 2004/17/EC. 127 However, these Directives do not have to be incorporated in their entirety and at once. This Annex dissects these Directives in "Basic Elements", "Mandatory Elements", "Non-mandatory Elements" and "Provisions outside the scope of the process of legislative approximation" and provides an indicative time schedule with five phases, each indicating the scope of EU legislation to be approximated and the specific type of market access which will be granted. The Trade Committee shall evaluate each phase and the reciprocal granting of market access will only take place after a positive assessment by that Committee. 128 It is clear that the drafters of this agreement envisaged with this procedure an incremental approach for legislative approximation in order to support the effective implementation of Ukraine's approximation obligations.
Finally, the DCFTA contains several other approximation clauses of which the fulfilment is not directly linked to additional market access. For example, in the area of competition, Ukraine must approximate its competition laws to the selected EU acquis, listed in Article 256 of the agreement.
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Also noteworthy is the DCFTA Chapter on Trade-Related Energy. 130 Regarding transport of electricity and gas, Ukraine must adapt the selection of EU legislation listed in Annex XXVII. Interesting is that this Annex incorporates several of Ukraine's approximation obligations under the EnC Treaty and, moreover, even goes beyond that by including EU legislation on areas such as energy efficiency and nuclear energy. 131 In the event of a conflict between the DCFTA Trade-Related Energy provisions and the EnC Treaty, the provisions of the EnC Treaty prevail. 132 Other approximation clauses can be found in the area of Customs and Trade Facilitation, 133 and Trade and Sustainable Development.
134
Hence, it is obvious that the EU-Ukraine AA includes a very complex and sophisticated patchwork of legislative approximation mechanisms which differ from other existing models of integration without membership. First, in comparison to the Swiss model of sectoral bilateral arrangements or the multilateral sectoralism of the EnC Treaty and the ECAA, the EU-Ukraine AA incorporates several different sectoral approximation mechanisms in a single legal instrument. Second, the various legislative approximation mechanisms included in the EU-Ukraine AA differ in scope and nature depending on the envisaged level of integration and market opening. Only in those areas where full internal market treatment is foreseen, such as in services and establishment, the arrangement is comparable to the mechanism for legislative approximation under the EEA. Third, in comparison to 125 Art. 154 EU-Ukraine AA.
126 European Commission, op. cit., footnote 41. . 129 It is remarkable that the list of the EU competition acquis that must be approximated by Ukraine is incorporated in the body of the agreement (Art. 256 EU-Ukraine AA), and not in an Annex. This implies that he Association Council cannot amend this selection of EU acquis according to Article 463 EU-Ukraine AA (cf. infra). 130 Chapter 11 DCFTA.
the EEA model, the EU-Ukraine arrangement for legislative approximation does not provide for the creation of a homogenous and dynamic legal space. Rather, it offers an alternative model based on strict market access conditionality. 135 It is noteworthy that in the AA, and especially in the DCFTA, different legal terms are used interchangeably and inconsistently to refer to the process of legislative approximation. Almost every DCFTA Chapter uses different terminology in its approximation clauses. This results in a mishmash of legal concepts and obligations according to which Ukraine must "approximate to", "align to" or "achieve conformity with" the EU acquis or make its domestic legislation "compatible" with the EU acquis or "incorporate" it in its domestic legal order. 136 Moreover, one single DCFTA provision can include several different approximation terms. 137 The main reason for this inconsistency appears that the different DCFTA chapters were negotiated by different negotiating teams of DG Trade or other Commission DGs, using each their own legal vocabulary to define these approximation obligations.
138
Because all these different terms refer to the same process, a more horizontal and consistent use of these terms, including precise definitions, would have been beneficial for the legal clarity of this agreement.
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Procedures to amend or update the incorporated EU acquis
Due to the constant evolution of EU law, applying a selection of EU acquis is for a third country as shooting on a moving target. Moreover, it could be that the Parties want to broaden the level of integration at a later stage and, therefore, envisage extending the selection of the incorporated EU acquis. In other words, a crucial challenge for the EU-Ukraine AA, and by extension for all EU integration agreements, is to keep the agreement up to date and in line with the evolving EU legislation. This can be based on either 'dynamic' or 'static' mechanisms depending on whether or not there is an obligation to adopt automatically every amendment to the EU acquis that is covered under the agreement.
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The most developed dynamic model for keeping track with changes in EU legislation is certainly incorporated in the EEA Agreement. Pursuant to Article 102 EEA, every modification to the EU acquis covered by the scope of this agreement must be discussed within the EEA Joint Committee, which shall amend the relevant EEA annexes in order to allow a simultaneous application of legislation in the entire EEA. A more static approach to the obligation of legislative approximation can be found in the EnC Treaty, which provides that the Energy Community "may take measures to implement amendments to the acquis" in the form of a decision or a recommendation of the 135 When comparing the EU-Ukraine AA with the EEA, it should be noted that the latter is "an international treaty sui generis which contains a distinct legal order of its own [and which] goes beyond what is usual for an agreement under public international law" (EFTA Court, Erla Maria Sveinbjörnsdòttir v. Government of Iceland, Case E-9/97, 1998, para 95). 136 See, for example, respectively, Arts. 64(1), 56(5), 56(1), 153(1) and Annex XVII EU-Ukraine AA. 137 For example, Art. 56 AA refers to process of "achieving conformity with", "approximation to", "incorporating into the legislation of Ukraine" and "aligning with" the annexed EU TBT acquis. 138 Interview EEAS official, 22 April 2014; Interview DG Trade official, 12 June 2013. 139 For an analysis of this 'approximation terminology', see A. Matta, 'Differentiating the methods of acquis export -the case of the Eastern Neighbourhood and Russia', in P. Van Elsuwege, R. Petrov (Eds.), op. cit. supra, footnote 9, pp. 21-45. 140 For the difference between static and dynamic procedures, see A. Lazowski, op. cit. supra note 9, 1444. A dynamic procedure does not mean that that every modification at the level of the EU law must automatically be transposed to the Agreement, however, the parties must at least consider to do so. Nevertheless, in some cases, the refusal to update the incorporated EU acquis can lead to the (partial) suspension or termination of the agreement (e.g. Art. 102(5) EEA)).
Ministerial Committee (or Permanent High Level Group provided it is authorised by the Ministerial Committee). 141 Again, the EU-Ukraine AA differs from other models of integration without membership. There is no single mechanism to amend the incorporated EU acquis, covering the entire agreement, but many different ones, varying from 'static' to 'dynamic' procedures.
According to Article 463(3) AA, the Association Council "may" update or amend the Annexes to the Agreement "[to take] into account the evolution of EU law", without prejudice to any specific provisions included in the DCFTA. In addition, the Association Council will also be the forum for exchange of information on EU and Ukrainian legislative acts, "both under preparation and in force". Because this allows the Ukrainian administrations to be consulted and to express their opinions and concerns on draft amendments of relevant legislation, this procedure can be considered as a limited form of "decision-shaping". However, this Article can hardly be seen as a dynamic procedure since the Association Council is not obliged to consider updating the Annexes to each and every modification of relevant EU legislation. Moreover, because the Association Council, which comprises both EU and Ukrainian representatives, must take decisions "by agreement", Ukraine can always veto this process.
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Specific provisions in several DCFTA Chapters go beyond this general clause of Article 463(3) EUUkraine AA. For example, Annex XVII to the Chapter on Services and Establishment contains a more elaborate dynamic procedure to amend the EU acquis included in this Annex. Different procedures are applicable before and after internal market treatment is granted in a specific sector. In the former case, "in order to guarantee legal certainty", the EU must inform Ukraine and the Trade Committee regularly on all new or amended relevant legislation. Then, the Trade Committee "shall" add within three months "any" new or amended EU legislation to the Annex, 143 which implies that Ukraine cannot refuse to update the annexes. 144 In the case internal market treatment is already granted, not automatically all amendments or new legislation must be added to the Annex as the Trade Committee can still decide whether or not to add them. 145 Nevertheless, if no agreement can be reached on the inclusion of new or amended EU legislation, the EU may decide to suspend the granting of internal market treatment in the sector concerned.
146 A more static procedure can be found in the area of public procurement. Here, Ukraine is obliged to take "due account 147 […] of any modifications of the EU acquis" in the process of legislative approximation. 148 Hence, even within the DCFTA part of the EUUkraine AA, various updating procedures are foreseen, again depending on the level of integration with the EU Internal Market and the objectives of each specific chapter.
Dispute Settlement and the role of (the case law) of the Court of Justice
The complex nature of the EU-Ukraine AA is also reflected in the provisions on dispute settlement. For disputes concerning the interpretation, application or implementation of the AA, a standard dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) is provided according to which the Association Council can 141 Arts. 25, 47, 53 and 76 EnC Treaty. 142 Combined reading of Arts. 462(1) and 463(1) EU-Ukraine AA. 143 Art. 3 Annex XVII EU-Ukraine AA. 144 However, the Trade Committee may decide whether Ukraine, under exceptional circumstances, can be "partly and temporarily" exempted from transposing this new or amended EU acquis (Art. 3(3) Annex XVII EU-Ukraine AA). 145 Art. 5 Annex XVII EU-Ukraine AA. settle disputes by way of a binding decision. 149 If an agreement cannot be reached in the Association Council after three months, the complaining Party is allowed to take "appropriate measures". 150 For disputes concerning the interpretation or application of provisions of the DCFTA (Title IV), a separate and more elaborate DSM is established. 151 This DSM is modelled upon the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding and is included in most of the recent EU FTAs. 152 It foresees, after a consultation period, in the establishment of an arbitration panel which shall rule on the dispute. Rulings of the arbitration panel are binding 153 and each Party must take any measure necessary to comply with them.
154 If the Party complained against fails to take such measures without offering a temporary compensation, the other Party is entitled to suspend obligations arising from the DCFTA "at a level equivalent to the nullification or impairment caused by the violation". 155 In the light of the recent gasconflicts between Russia and Ukraine and its impact of several eastern EU Member States, the DCFTA DSM establishes shorter procedures regarding disputes concerning an interruption of any transport of natural gas, oil, or electricity or a threat thereof. 156 Moreover, for several DCFTA Chapters, a mediation mechanism is provided.
The procedure of Article 322 EU-Ukraine AA is crucial to preserve the Court of Justice's exclusive jurisdiction to interpret the EU acquis. 161 It is settled case law that the EU and its Member States are not bound by a particular interpretation of rules of EU law, referred to in an agreement which "extends" the EU acquis to third countries such as the EEA and the ECAA. 162 In Opinion 1/91 on the draft EEA Agreement, the Court of Justice also clarified that the interpretation of EU rules cannot be entrusted to bodies created on the basis of international agreements. 163 In order to avoid a repetition of the EEA saga, Article 322 EU-Ukraine AA precludes the arbitration panel to give a binding ruling on the interpretation of the agreement's provisions which are essentially rules of EU law by delegating disputes on "a question of interpretation of a provision of EU law" to the Court of Justice by means of a preliminary ruling. 164 In addition to this preliminary ruling procedure, the EU-Ukraine AA includes specific provisions guaranteeing the uniform interpretation of legal norms. It is well known that similar provisions in international agreements and in EU law do not automatically have the same meaning but that the objective, purpose and context of the agreement needs to be taken into account. 165 Of course, the situation is different when express provisions on identical interpretation are laid down in an agreement itself. 166 It is noteworthy that several DCFTA Chapters contain such explicit provisions. The most straightforward obligation can be found, somewhat hidden, in the annex to the Services and Establishment Chapter. Article 6 of Annex XVII states that: To this end judgments of these Courts shall be transmitted to the EEA Joint Committee which shall act so as to preserve the homogeneous interpretation of the Agreement." 167 Article 322 EU-Ukraine AA does not make such a distinction between pre-signature and post-signature case law. 168 Of course, another major difference with the EEA Agreement is that in the case of the EU-Ukraine AA this obligation of consistent interpretation only applies to a specific DCFTA chapter and not to the entire agreement.
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Constitutional challenges for the implementation of the EU-Ukraine AA
After the long and difficult process leading to the signature and conclusion of the EU-Ukraine AA, significant challenges for the effective implementation of this ambitious legal framework need to be addressed. Three issues can be distinguished: the implications of Russia's annexation of Crimea, the status of the AA and decisions of the Association Council in the Ukrainian legal system and the potential direct effect of the AA in the EU legal order.
The Crimea question and the territorial scope of the AA
The text of the EU-Ukraine AA was already initialed before the Russian annexation of Crimea. 170 Consequently, this issue and its impact on the territorial scope of application of the AA are not addressed in the text of the agreement. Nevertheless, the question has important implications, in particular for the DCFTA part and the determination of the rules of origin.
171
According to the European Council, the EU "strongly condemns the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol to the Russian Federation and will not recognise it".
172 Consequently, it can be argued that products from the Crimea region are by the EU still considered to be goods originating in Ukraine and, therefore, benefit from the preferential trade regime foreseen in the DCFTA or in the EU's autonomous trade preferences. However, in practice, only Russian authorities will be able to issue the relevant origin certificates for products manufactured or processed in Crimea. As confirmed by the Court of Justice, the EU cannot accept the proof of origin issued by authorities other than those designed by name in the relevant (preferential) agreement. 173 Because there are no competent customs authorities in Crimea to establish the origin of the goods as 'Ukrainian', the products can de facto not benefit from preferential treatment of the DCFTA. Meanwhile, the European Council has asked the Commission to evaluate the legal consequences of the annexation of Crimea and to propose economic, trade and financial restrictions regarding Crimea for rapid implementation. 174 On a proposal by the Commission, the Council made a first step in this regard on 23 June 2014 when it prohibited the import of goods originating in Crimea or Sevastopol into the EU. However, goods originating in 168 Other examples of similar provisions which also make a difference between pre-and post signature case law are Art. 
The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and the Ukrainian Constitution
The implementation of the EU-Ukraine AA creates important challenges from the perspective of Ukrainian constitutional law. According to Article 9 of the 1996 Constitution:
International treaties that are in force, agreed to be binding by the Verkhovna Rada [Parliament] of Ukraine, are part of the national legislation of Ukraine. The conclusion of international treaties that contravene the Constitution of Ukraine is possible only after introducing relevant amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine. 184 This provision implies that, after ratification, the EU-Ukraine AA will be an integral part of the Ukrainian legal order. Pursuant to Article 19(2) of the "law on international treaties of Ukraine", it will enjoy priority over conflicting national legislation. 185 However, this is not the case if there is a conflict with the provisions of the Ukrainian constitution. In this respect, it is noteworthy that some of the EU-Ukraine AA provisions impose commitments on Ukraine that directly contradict the national constitution. For instance, Article 8 AA binds Ukraine to ratify and implement the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court and its related instruments. However, in a judgment of 11 July 2001, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine concluded that several provisions of the Rome Statute were not in conformity with the national Constitution.
186 Consequently, the ratification of the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court by the Verkhovna Rada is only possible after a constitutional revision and a positive ruling of the Constitutional Court. 187 Another issue concerns the approximation of Ukrainian legislation to the dynamic EU acquis. Taking into account that Ukrainian institutions are not involved in the decision-making process of EU legislation, the question arises to what extent this can be reconciled with fundamental constitutional principles such as legality and sovereignty. 188 One of the major problems to be solved in the course of implementation and application of the EUUkraine AA is the lack of direct enforceability of international agreements in the Ukrainian legal order. 189 In particular, the question arises how binding decisions of the Association Council will be applied in Ukraine. The Ukrainian legal system has never experienced the necessity to apply binding decisions of institutions established under the framework of an international agreement. This challenge has been faced by other associated countries too. Ukraine shall belong exclusively to the people and shall not be usurped by the State, its bodies, or officials". 189 This happens mainly due to: 1) the belief that international case law is not relevant to continental law systems; 2) the translation of case law and jurisprudence; 3) lack of translation of case law into Ukrainian to help judges adapt their decisions to best European standards. Furthermore, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine is not always expedient in solving conflicts between ratified international agreements and national legislation. legal order. 190 The Norwegian Parliament adopted a statutory law on implementation of the EEA Agreement in 1992. This law granted provisions of the EEA Agreement and its secondary law supremacy over conflicting national legislation. The Norwegian law on implementation of the EEA Agreement clarified that relevant EU Regulations are to be implemented without change but the implementation of EU Directives must take into account choice of form and method of implementation. 191 In order to ensure effective application of the relevant EU acquis within the myriad of sectoral agreements with the EU, Switzerland adopted several implementation laws too. For example, the Swiss Federal Law on Internal Market mirrors most of the relevant EU legislation and the Swiss Law on Federal Parliament ensures "euro compatibility" of Swiss law drafts with the EU acquis. 192 Hence, the adoption of a special implementation law clarifying the implications of the EU-Ukraine AA for the application and interpretation of national legislation is a crucial prerequisite to tackle most challenges of legislative approximation. It is noteworthy that Ukraine has already gained some experience in ensuring the implementation of international norms after the ratification of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) in 1997. The incorporation of the ensuing obligations took place by means of two laws. The first was a law on ratification of the ECHR wherein Ukraine recognised the jurisdiction of the European Court on Human Rights (ECtHR). 193 The second was a special law on the application of case law of the ECtHR in Ukraine. It imposed on Ukraine a duty of mandatory and timely execution of all ECtHR judgments. 194 In accordance with these laws judgments of the ECtHR are being formally accepted by the national judiciary as sources of law and Ukrainian judges frequently refer to the ECtHR judgments in their decisions. However, the rate of effective application of the ECtHR case law in Ukraine is considered as unsatisfactory and lags far behind other European countries. 195 Another relevant tool to reconcile the EU-Ukraine AA with national constitutional requirements is the so-called 'Euro-friendly interpretation' of national legislation. This is a common practice in most countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Western Balkan region. 196 For instance, in 1997 the Polish Constitutional Tribunal rejected the binding force of EU law provisions in the EU-Poland AA within the Polish legal order but acknowledged the obligation of the Polish government and judiciary to interpret "the existing legislation in such a way as to ensure the greatest possible degree of such compatibility". 197 The Czech Constitutional Court emphasised the special importance of EU law for the Czech legal system and frequently cited the EU acquis including the Court of Justice case law in its jurisprudence. 198 Undoubtedly, the Ukrainian Constitutional Court will have a chance to rule on the Euro-friendly interpretation of the EU-Ukraine AA within the national legal order and refer to experiences of other associate countries which either already joined the EU or are on the pre-accession track. Another solution could be an amendment of the Ukrainian Constitution in order to ensure direct enforceability of the EU-Ukraine AA. In 2001, both the Czech and Slovak republics made international law directly enforceable in their domestic legal systems by amending their respective constitutions. 199 However, it is unlikely that Ukraine will introduce new amendments that imply at least a minimal limitation of national sovereignty. Such a scenario is politically sensitive taking into account that a threat to national sovereignty was one of the reasons for rejecting the offer to take part in the Eurasian customs union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Be that as it may, the EUUkraine AA will stimulate a process of constitutional reform, not only to accommodate the relationship with international and European law but also to comply with the ambitious objectives of political association, economic integration and legislative approximation with the EU. The scope of the EU acquis to be adopted by Ukraine is massive and covers not only EU legislation but also EU fundamental principles, doctrines and the Court of Justice case law. In addition to formal legislative amendments, Ukrainian civil servants and judges will require in depth training in EU law in order to be able to apply the approximated legislation in their everyday activities.
The question of direct effect in the EU legal order
The issue of direct applicability of the EU-Ukraine AA not only concerns the constitutional system of Ukraine but is also of particular importance within the legal order of the EU. Over the years, the Court of Justice has developed a consistent practice of accepting the direct effect of bilateral agreements on the condition that the provisions invoked are clear and unconditional. 200 Only if the agreement contains a formulation excluding the direct applicability of the agreement or the direct effect of some its provisions, the situation is different. The latter is the case for the EU-Ukraine AA. For instance, chapter 14 on the specific dispute settlement mechanism in relation to the DCFTA part of the agreement explicitly provides that "[f]or the avoidance of doubt, this Title shall not be construed as conferring rights or imposing obligations which can be directly invoked before the domestic courts of the Parties." Arguably, the introduction of such a statement was deemed necessary to ensure consistency with the multilateral dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO, which does not have direct effect in the EU's legal order. 201 The same logic applies with regard to the inclusion of references that certain specific commitments laid down in annexes to the agreement "shall have no self-executing effect and thus confer no rights directly on natural or legal persons." 202 This practice, which can also be observed in other recently concluded EU free trade agreements, avoids the possibility to circumvent the non-direct effect of WTO commitments.
Significantly, in addition to the specific clauses precluding direct effect of the AA's trade dispute settlement mechanism and the WTO-like commitments in the field of establishment and services, the Council Decisions on the signing and provisional application of the AA unequivocally provide that "[t]he Agreement shall not be construed as conferring rights or imposing obligations which can be directly invoked before Union or Member State courts or tribunals." 204 The question arises to what extent such a unilateral declaration, which is not part of the agreement itself, precludes the direct effect of the AA's clear and unconditional provisions. This issue is particularly relevant with regard to the non-discrimination clause of Article 17(1) EU-Ukraine AA, which provides that "[s]ubject to the laws, conditions and procedures applicable in each Member State and the EU, treatment accorded to workers who are Ukrainian nationals and who are legally employed in the territory of a Member State shall be free of any discrimination based on nationality, as regards working conditions, remuneration or dismissal, compared to the nationals of that Member State". In the Simutenkov judgment, the Court of Justice concluded that an identically worded provision of the PCA with Russia "has direct effect, with the result that individuals to whom that provision applies are entitled to rely on it before the courts of the Member States." 205 Precluding a similar right for Ukrainian nationals would, therefore, lead to a very paradoxical situation. It would imply that an old PCA with Russia having relatively limited ambitions of partnership would have more far-reaching direct legal implications than a far more ambitious association agreement with Ukraine. 206 Remarkably, the Council could have easily avoided the legal uncertainty regarding the direct effect of the non-discrimination clause without opening the door to direct effect of the other (trade-related) provisions. As noted above, a separate 'split' Council Decision was adopted for Article 17 EUUkraine AA. This Council Decision gave the Council the option not to unilaterally exclude direct effect of this provision, however, instead it chose to do so by including the same provision as in the 'general' Council Decision for the conclusion of the AA which excludes direct effect.
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Even though it appears difficult for the Court of Justice to ignore the clear-cut instructions of the Council, the implications for the direct effect of the EU-Ukraine AA are not straightforward. As Advocate General Saggio observed in his Opinion in Portugal v Council "[i]t need hardly be stated that a unilateral interpretation of the agreement made in the context of an internal adoption procedure cannot -outside the system of reservations -limit the effects of the agreement itself." 208 Arguably, the objective content of the textual provisions of the agreement takes priority over wishes expressed in separate unilateral declarations. This seems in line with the rules of customary international law, according to which "a treaty must be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose. The text of the treaty is the primary source of interpretation, while external aids such as travaux prépratoires constitute a supplementary source." 209 
